l 日程 3月23日 （月） 13:00 ～14：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎3号館1213室
l 報告者 Nobuyuki Hanaki (Aix-Marseille 大学)
l 題目 The effect of strategic environment and group size in beauty contest
games
(with Angela Sutan and Marc Willinger)
l 概要： Does the effect of strategic
environments (strategic substitution v.s.
strategic complement) on the experimental outcomes depend on the
size of group?
We investigated this question by varying the group size, 2-player vs 8-player,
in the two versions of beauty contest games with an interior equilibrium.
We replicate main finding of a previous study that shows significantly
larger
deviations of chosen numbers from the equilibrium under the strategic
complementarity than under the strategic substitution for 8-player
games.
We found, however, that such a significant effect of the strategic environment
disappears in 2 player games.
終了したセミナー(2014年度)
|
|
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
5月8日 |
Stefano Iacus 氏 （University of
Milan） |
How Coarsening Simplifies Matching-Based Causal Inference Theory |
|
6月10日 |
Nori Tarui氏 |
Other-regarding behavior under collective action |
|
6月19日 |
小枝 淳子氏
（東京大学大学院経済学研究科 |
EXITING FROM QE |
|
7月3日 |
高宮 浩司氏
（新潟大学准教授） |
Incentive compatibility in a generalized matching model |
|
7月24日 |
岡田 章氏
（一橋大学教授） |
A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with
Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types |
|
11月6日 |
栗野 盛光氏 （筑波大学システム情報系社会工学域助教） |
College Admissions with Entrance Exams:
|
|
12月4日 （木） |
Jacob Goeree 氏
(University of Zurich 教授) |
Noisy introspection in the "11-20" game |
|
12月18日 （木） |
Kohei Kawamura氏 （University of
Edinburgh准教授） |
Deliberation and Collective Decisions: An
Overview |
|
12月18日 （木） |
Kohei Kawamura氏 （University
of Edinburgh准教授） |
Understanding (Non)equilibrium Choices in
Simple Games |
|
1月26日 （月） |
Syngjoo Cho (国立ソウル大学准教授) |
(Dynamic) Inconsistencies of
Intertemporal Choice |
|
2月25日 （水） |
Oskar Skibski
(九州大学ポスドク) |
Shapley Value for Games with Externalities and Games on
Graphs |
|
3月16日 （月） |
Rene van den
Brink
(アムステルダムVU大学准教授) |
Comparable Characterizations of Four Values
for Permission Tree Games |
l 日程 5月8日 （木）17:30 ～19：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 Stefano Iacus（University
of Milan）
l 題目 How Coarsening Simplifies Matching-Based Causal Inference Theory
l 概要：The simplicity and power of matching
methods have made them an increasingly popular approach to causal inference in
observational data. Existing theories that justify these techniques are well
developed but either require exact matching, which is usually infeasible in
practice, or sacrifice some simplicity via asymptotic theory, specialized bias
corrections, and novel variance estimators; and extensions to approximate
matching with multicategory treatments have not yet appeared. As an additional
option for researchers, we show how conceptualizing continuous variables as
having logical breakpoints (such as phase transitions when measuring temperature
or high school or college degrees in years of education) is both natural
substantively and can be used in some applications to construct a relatively
simple theory of causal inference. The result is a finite sample theory that is
simple to understand and easy to implement by using matching to preprocess the
data, after which one can use whatever method would have been applied without
matching. The theoretical simplicity also allows for binary, multicategory, and
continuous treatment variables from the start and for extensions to valid
inference under imperfect treatment assignment. In applications where the
existing theory of matching is difficult to apply, the new approach added to
the existing toolkit may help some researchers in these situations make valid
causal inferences, or at least better understand why they cannot.
l 日程 6月10日 （火）16:40 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館2階 現政研会議室
l 報告者 Nori Tarui氏（ハワイ大学准教授）
l 題目 Other-regarding behavior under collective action
l 概要：In many collective
action settings, such as decisions on public education or climate change
mitigation, actions of a group have welfare consequences for themselves as well
as their followers. We conduct laboratory experiments with two-stage
predecessor-follower prisoners' dilemma and coordination games with dynamic
externalities to study whether concerns for the followers' welfare affect the
predecessors' behavior. We find that predecessors often give up own payoffs to
avoid imposing negative externalities on the followers, but not to generate
positive externalities for the followers. A concern for the followers aligned
with own group payoff maximization motive helps to resolve socialdilemma and
coordination problems; yet, a conffict in motives greatly exacerbates both
free-riding and coordination on the payoff-inferior equilibrium. We also find
strong evidence of social learning: the followers tend to blindly mimic their
own predecessor, but act opposite to their match's predecessor, no matter
whether these actions are welfare-improving or not.
l 日程 6月19日（木）16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 小枝 淳子氏（東京大学大学院経済学研究科特任講師）
l 題目 EXITING FROM QE
l 概要：We develop a regime-switching SVAR (structural vector autoregression) in which the monetary policy regime, chosen by the central bank responding to economic conditions, is endogenous and observable. There are two regimes, one of which is QE (quantitative easing). The model can incorporate the exit condition for terminating QE. We then apply the model to Japan, a country that has accumulated, by our count, 130 months of QE as of December 2012. Our impulse response and counter-factual analyses yield two findings about QE. First, an increase in reserves raises inflation and output. Second, terminating QE can be expansionary.
l 日程 7月3日（木）16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 高宮 浩司氏（新潟大学准教授）
l 題目 Incentive
compatibility in a generalized matching model
l 日程 7月24日（木）16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 岡田 章氏（一橋大学教授）
l 題目 A Non-cooperative
Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types
l 概要： We consider a non-cooperative two-person
sequential bargaining game with incomplete
information. Player types are verifiable when a contract is implemented. We
show that there
is no delay in agreements and the inscrutability principle holds under the
property of independence
of irrelevant types (IIT), whereby the response of every type of player is
independent of proposals
to other player types. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential
equilibrium satisfying IIT
and a self-selection property for every discount factor for future payoffs. We
also show that the
equilibrium proposal of every player converges to the ex post Nash bargaining
solution as the
discount factor goes to one.
l 日程 11月6日（木）16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館2階 現政研会議室
l 報告者 栗野盛光氏（筑波大学システム情報系社会工学域助教）
l 題目 College Admissions with Entrance Exams:
Centralized versus Decentralized
l 日程 12月4日 （木） 16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎3号館304教室
l 報告者 Jacob Goeree
(University of Zurich 教授)
l 題目 Noisy introspection in the "11-20" game
l 日程 12月18日 （木） 14:45 ～16：15
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館2階 現政研会議室
l 報告者 Kohei Kawamura氏 （University
of Edinburgh准教授）
l 題目 Deliberation and Collective Decisions: An Overview
l 概要： 熟議民主主義に関するサーベイ
l 日程 12月18日 （木） 16:30 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館2階 現政研会議室
l 報告者 Kohei Kawamura氏 （University
of Edinburgh准教授）
l 題目 Understanding (Non)equilibrium Choices in Simple Games
l 概要： 最後通牒ゲーム・信頼ゲーム・スタグハントにおける行動を strategic uncertainty、risk
aversion、other-regarding preferences に「分解」する実験論文
l 日程 1月26日 （月） 17:00 ～18：30
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎3号館1213教室
l 報告者 Syngjoo Cho (国立ソウル大学准教授)
l 題目 (Dynamic)
Inconsistencies of Intertemporal Choice
l 日程 2月25日 （水） 17:30 ～18：30
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎3号館1213室
l 報告者 Oskar Skibski (九州大学ポスドク)
l 題目 Shapley
Value for Games with Externalities and Games on Graphs
l 日程 3月16日 （月） 17:00 ～18：00
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎3号館1213室
l 報告者 Rene van den Brink (アムステルダムVU大学准教授)
l 題目 Comparable
Characterizations of Four Values for Permission Tree Games
(joint work with Chris Dietz, Gerard van der Laan and Genjiu Xu)
l 概要： In
the field of cooperative games there is an extensive literature that studies
situations of restricted cooperation. Myerson (1979) introduced communication
graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an
undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson
value of such a game is obtained by taking the Shapley value of the
corresponding restricted game. For the special case that the graph is
cycle-free and connected, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the
corresponding hierarchical outcome, being the marginal contribution vector for
a particular permutation of the player set induced by the graph. Gilles, Owen
and van den Brink (1992) introduced games with a (hierarchical) permission
structure modeled by a directed graph on the set of players. In the conjunctive
(disjunctive) approach, a coalition is said to be feasible, if for every player
in the coalition also all (at least one of) its predecessors (if any) belong(s)
to the coalition. The conjunctive (disjunctive) permission value is obtained by
taking the Shapley value of the associated conjunctive (disjunctive) restricted
game. The two approaches coincide when the permission structure is given by a
rooted tree.
In
this paper we consider games with a hierarchical permission structure given by
a rooted tree and modify the Myerson value to a value for such games. We also
consider for these games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of
the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all payoff to the
unique top player in the hierarchy. Then comparable characterizations are given
of these three solutions and the (conjunctive) permission value.
|
|
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
6月6日（木） |
金子守 |
ナッシュ社会厚生関数、社会制度、そして 個人の認識 |
|
6月13日(木) |
グレーヴァ香子 |
Dynamic Noncooperative Group Formation with Size Advantage and Group Reputation |
|
7月23日（火） |
田中知美 (世界銀行コンサルタント) |
Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
|
7月25日（木） |
花木伸行 (Aix-Marseille Univesity) |
Strategic uncertainty in an experimental asset market |
|
11月5日（火） |
Zsombor Meder |
Naivete and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency |
|
11月6日（水） |
Felix Albrecht (Ph.D candidate, University Marburg) |
Punishment Patterns |
|
12月5日(木) |
山邑紘史（東京工業大学） |
Interpersonal Comparison Necessary for Arrovian Aggregation |
|
|
三谷羊平 |
Hierarchical Agglomeration Bonus for Private Land Conservation |
l 日程 6月6日（木）１６：３０－１８：００
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 金子守氏（早稲田大学）
l 題目 ナッシュ社会厚生関数、社会制度、そして 個人の認識
※金子守先生の早稲田大学移籍後の初めてのセミナーとなります。
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 グレーヴァ香子氏（慶應義塾大学）
l 題目 Dynamic Noncooperative Group Formation with Size Advantage and Group Reputation
l Extended Abstract analyze
a noncooperative dynamic game of group formation with group reputation. It is inspired by observations
of ``name adoption" patterns in some retail
markets. Suppose that a market can sustain N
firms. Firms are partitioned into name groups, or affiliation networks. In a group, all firms share the same
group reputation among consumers. If a firm fails, an entrant firm chooses which name to adopt or to create a new name. There is no cost of choosing any name, but group
size and history matter. Joining a larger group has an advantage of
non-linearly increasing rate of choice by consumers, but has a disadvantage of
higher rate of future failure within the group. Reputation information is
endogenous and imperfect in the sense that consumers observe failure of a firm
only in the group that they patronized in the current period. Firms stay in the game until it fails stochastically (e.g., due to
imperfect monitoring), and a small fraction of consumers exit the game for an
exogenous cause (death, moving etc.) each period. Newcomer consumers do not have
information about group histories and thus choose firm groups randomly but
favor larger groups over smaller groups.
The non-linear likelihood of group choice is formulated by Lanchester's
Square Law (Lanchester, 1916). Existing firms (groups) cannot reject an
entering firm's adoption of the name. (This is the case for categorical names:
for the retail industry, various cooperative names exist in the same place,
e.g., cooperatives, savings association, and trade association. For the banking
industry, credit union, thrift, and savings and loan association can be used
for the same type of business.) For
simplicity, there is no explicit interaction among firms in the same group
(unlike industrial organization literature of collusion, joint ventures etc.),
nor network structure choice by the firms.
An entering firm determines the group size distribution of that period,
but it changes over time by stochastic failure and later entrants. We consider
firms' optimization over uncertain horizon, instead of (myopic) best-response
dynamic (Bala and Goyal, 2000) or finitely repeated social game (e.g., Jackson
and Watts, 2010). Empirical patterns have synergy effects as follows. If a name group has a failure, it is
less likely that the tainted name gets adopted soon afterwards. If a name is
created/joined by a new firm, then it is more likely that the same name is
adopted afterwards. Other facts include that new names are more likely to be
created when there is no untainted group. We found that even if the tainted
name group was the universal group (all firms having the same name), creating a
new name is better than joining the tainted but dominant group, when consumer
turnover rate is small, confirming the first pattern. (Hence the universal
connected network is not absorbing.)
In addition, if the failure rate is sufficiently small, the dynamic
process of group structure is recurrent among two group partitions and the
universal group. This is because a
new name is created after a failure in the universal group, but one of the two
groups grows afterwards, back to the universal group. New name creation does not occur when
there is an untainted name group to join. These are consistent with the second
and third pattern.
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 田中知美 (世界銀行コンサルタント Economic Development & Global Education, LLC、元アリゾナ州立大学助教授)
l 題目 Behavioral Approach to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
l 概要：We examine repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the prediction of standard game theory. Instead of assuming full rationality and pure self-interest, we introduce naiveté and social preferences, i.e., reciprocal concerns, and develop a model that is consistent with, and uniquely predicts, the observed behavior in the experiments. Our behavioral model suggests there is a trade-off between naiveté and reciprocity. When people are concerned about reciprocity, they tend to make fewer random choices.
l 報告論文については以下からダウンロード出来ます。
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2013/2013cf879.pdf
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 花木 伸行氏 (Aix-Marseille Univesity教授)
l 題目 Strategic
uncertainty in an experimental asset market
l 会場: 早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階 現代政治経済研究所会議室
l 報告者: Zsombor Meder (Ph.D candidate, Maastricht University)
l 報告題: Naivete and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
l 共著者: Janos Flesch, Zsombor Z. Meder and Ronald Peeters
l 概要:This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic inconsistency in the context of Markov decision problems. It
carefully decouples and examines concepts that are often entwined in the literature: it distinguishes between the decision maker and its
various temporal agents, and between the beliefs and intentions of the agents. Classical examples naivete and sophisticattion are modeled
and contrasted based on this new language. We show that naive and sophisticated decision makers can form optimal strategies at each
possible history, and provide comparisons of well-being for a class of decision
problems including procrastination, impulsiveness, underinvestment, binges and
indulgence. The creation of a unified formalism to deal
with dynamic inconsistency allows for the introduction of a hybrid type of decision maker, who is naive in some states and sophisticated in
others. Such a hybrid type can be used to model situations which were inaccessible
with previous approaches. Interestingly, the analysis of hybrid types indicates
that self-deception can be optimal like in the indulgence problem.
l 日時：2013年11月6日（水）17:00-18:30
l 会場：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階 現代政治経済研究所会議室
l 報告者：Felix Albrecht (Ph.D candidate, University Marburg)
l 報告題：Punishment Patterns (joint work with Sebastian Kube, Christian Traxler)
l 概要：This
paper studies patterns of punishment in a one-shot public goods game. Building
upon a novel strategy-method approach at the punishment stage of the game, we classify
individual punishment patterns. We find that almost 40% of the subjects never
engage in punishment. Among those who punish, the vast majority displays a
clear pro-social pattern of punishment. Employing a within-subject design, we then
compare these punishment patterns with conditional contribution patterns. This
allows us to analyze two-dimensional type classifications. Our data indicate
high frequencies of ‘consistent’types: conditional cooperators that punish pro-socially as well as
free-riders that never punish. However, the analysis also reveals a
non-negligible share of free-riders that punish and conditional cooperators
that do not engage in punishment.
l 日時: 2013年12月5日（木）15:30-19:00（通常と時間が異なります）
l 会場: 早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス１号館４階４０１教室
l 報告者: 山邑紘史氏（東京工業大学）
l 報告題: Interpersonal Comparison Necessary for Arrovian Aggregation
l 概要:While
studies of social welfare functional have revealed that some interpersonal
comparability, such as ordinal and level comparability and cardinal and unit comparability,
resolves Arrow's impossibility result, we have not known yet what kind of
information is necessary to resolve it. The purpose of this paper is to capture
the feature of informational structures which make social welfare functionals
satisfying Strong Pareto, Anonymity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
available. To do so, we provide a characterization of such informational
structures. We know from this characterization that if utility levels are not
interpersonally comparable, then transformed utility functions by a certain
transformation need to be cardinal and unit comparable
l 場所 早稲田大学早稲田校舎1号館4階４０１教室
l 報告者 三谷羊平氏（京都大学）
l 題目 Hierarchical Agglomeration Bonus for Private Land Conservation
l 概要: Voluntary incentive schemes have been increasingly used in
recent years for biodiversity
conservation on private land. However, landowner’s voluntary
decision results in small fragmented reserves, which
can cause species extinction. We propose a hierarchical agglomeration bonus (HAB) mechanism to create
incentives for agents in a hierarchical
spatial structure to promote local-level coordination. Our HAB mechanism allocates an agglomeration bonus
(AB) payment between a local-level bonus
rewarding successful local-level coordination
and a global-level bonus rewarding successful global-level coordination. In addition to payoff- and
risk-dominant equilibria, Pareto-ranked
Nash equilibria can arise in our HAB coordination
game, which can facilitate and maintain local-level coordination. We conducted a
laboratory experiment to explore the performance of the HAB mechanism for a hierarchical
spatial structure where three local
communities of three individuals are nested in a larger global community. The results show that allocating a
higher portion of the total AB to
local-level bonuses sharply reduces coordination
failure and facilitates a consensus on selecting the payoff dominant strategy at the local community level,
leading to a larger-scale, global community
level successful coordination. The results
suggest that the locally weighted HAB scheme can contribute to habitat connectivity as well as successful global
coordination.
|
|
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
4月26日（木） |
Noemí Navarro |
How to Add Apples and Pears: |
|
5月17日(木) |
星野 匡郎氏 |
Estimation of Semiparametric Binary Choice Models with Missing Response Data |
|
6月7日(木) |
庄司 匡宏氏 |
Guilt Aversion and Peer Information in Crime: Evidence from Experiment and Survey Data in a Developing Country |
|
7月5日(木） |
糟谷祐介氏 |
Anti-bullying School Choice Mechanism Design |
|
8月3日（金） |
穂刈 享氏 |
Anti-duality in TU-games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations |
|
11月1日 |
Jeffrey Kline |
Evaluations of the Epistemic Components for Resolving the Muddy Children Puzzle |
|
12月20日 |
浅古泰史氏 |
The Boy who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubble (with Kozo Ueda), |
|
1月10日(木) |
Charles
Noussair |
Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets: Fundamental and Emotional Processes |
· 場所：1号館4階401教室
· 報告者：Charles Noussair （Professor, Tilburg University）
· 題目：Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets: Fundamental and Emotional Processes
概要：Charles Noussair教授はGLOPE2最終コンファレンスに参加されるために来日する。その滞在日程中に、同教授の最新の実験研究を報告していただく。 大学院生も多数参加するため、特に、わかりやすく報告していただくことをお願いしている。
· 場所：1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
· 報告者：穂刈 享氏（慶応大学教授）
· 題目：Anti-duality in TU-games applied to solutions, axioms, and
axiomatizations
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者 糟谷祐介氏（Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management,MEDS博士課程大学院生）
· 題目：Anti-bullying School Choice Mechanism Design
· 概要：The market design approach to school choice has uncovered the
desirable properties of the popular mechanisms. However, an educational concern
for peer effects, especially the implication of the bullying problems on
student assignment has escaped due notice in the literature. This paper first
proposes a new framework to study the bullying problems together with school
choice. Then it shows that the suitably modified variants of these popular
mechanisms have the anti-bullying property (i.e., they systematically separate
bullies from their victims, and assign a less preferable school seat to a
student if she is involved in an additional bullying episode as a bully)
together with other standard desiderata. Finally, by investigating the
complementary roles of the market design and anti-bullying program, I discuss
the interwoven future perspective of the collaboration between the two fields.
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者Noemí Navarro（Université de Sherbrooke）
· 題目："How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus" (joint with Samuel Danthine)
· 概要：We generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining
solution and the linear division of the joint surplus when bargainers use
different utility scales. This equivalence in the general case requires the
surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or comparable, units.
This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. Our
conclusions have important implications for comparative static exercises and
calibrated work. For example, when comparing the joint surplus of economies
with different preferences, it is crucial to lay out the surplus in terms of
one utility unit or the other. On the other hand, while it is necessary to
transform the units when expressing the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution
as a share of the joint surplus, it is not necessary to perform a unit
transformation when maximizing directly the generalized Nash product. Finally,
we discuss the requirements on the curvatures of the agents’utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’attitudes towards risk.
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者 星野匡郎（東京工業大学大学院情報理工学系研究科助手）
· 題目：Estimation of Semiparametric Binary Choice Models with Missing Response Data
· 概要：This study investigates identification of parameters in the semiparametric binary choice models when there are nonignorable nonresponses. We propose an estimation procedure for the identified set of parameters based on the special regressor approach, Lewbel (2000). We show that the estimator for the identified set is consistent in the Hausdorff metric. To demonstrate the availability of the proposed methodology, we present an empirical case study consisting of an economic valuation of a landscape with a dichotomous choice contingent valuation.
· 2012年6月7日(木） 16時30分から18時00分
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者 庄司 匡宏氏（成城大学経済学部）
· 題目：Guilt Aversion and Peer Information in Crime: Evidence from Experiment and Survey Data in a Developing Country
· 概要：It has been discussed that the existence of peer effect causes the
disparity in criminal incidence, but few studies examine how it occurs. I
conduct an artefactual field experiment in rural Bangladesh with randomly
sampled participants to identify what causes the peer effects. Particularly, I
test two channels based on the guilt aversion preference; through the change in
guilt sensitivity and the second order belief. A novel contribution of this
experiment is that it elicits the guilt sensitivity at the individual level. I
find that the patterns of criminal behavior are consistent with the guilt
aversion rather than the altruism and trustworthiness; participants with higher
guilt sensitivity and/or lower second order belief are less likely to commit
crime. The peer effect occurs through the changes in the second order belief;
when crime is common, individuals anticipate that the others expect higher risk
of crime victimization, which in turn declines the guilt from committing crime.
By using the survey data collected from the same participant households, I show
the validity of the elicited guilt sensitivity; individuals are less likely to
experience crime victimization in the villages where villagers have higher
guilt sensitivity.
· 場所：1号館401教室
· 報告者：Jeffrey Kline (The University of Queensland)
· 題目：Evaluations of the Epistemic Components for Resolving the Muddy Children Puzzle
· 概要：We evaluate the 3 child muddy children puzzle using the epistemic
logic of shallow depths GLEF . We give a resolution to the puzzle that involves
only shallow depths of interpersonal inferences and does not use common
knowledge. This resolution makes the necessary beliefs, interpersonal
inferences, and interpretations of inactions explicit. We also show that our
resolution is a minimal one in a certain sense.
· 場所：1号館4階401教室
· 報告者：浅古泰史氏（早稲田大学）
· 題目：The Boy who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubble (with Kozo Ueda),
· 概要：Governments seemed unsuccessful in their attempts to stop bubbles
through the use of warnings. This paper examines the effects of public warnings
using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a
bubble can stop it if investors believe that the government issues such
warnings only after bubbles start. Moreover, the bubble may crash before the
warning. If there is the possibility that the government issues a warning even
though bubble does not occur, then warnings cannot stop the bubble immediately.
Our model suggests that, for public warnings, it is not type-II errors but
rather type-I errors that are important in preventing bubbles. Public warnings
are effective when they provide information to less-informed investors.
|
日程 |
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
5月26日（木） |
原 千秋 氏 |
Heterogeneous impatience and dynamic inconsistency |
|
6月2日 |
武岡 則男 氏 |
Stochastic Endogenous Time Preference |
|
6月16日（木） |
篠 潤之介 氏 |
A Positive Theory of Fixed-Rate Funds-Supplying Operations in an Accommodative Financial Environment |
|
7月14日（木） |
星野 匡郎 氏 |
Quantile regression in spatial autoregressive semivarying-coefficient models |
|
7月28日（木） |
大垣 昌夫 氏 |
Cultures, Worldviews, and Intergenerational Altruism |
|
10月3日（月） |
Ron Harstad 氏 |
Political Economy Field Experiments Become Possible |
|
10月13日（木） |
Dimitry Rtischev 氏 |
Evolution of preferences, mindsight, and cooperation |
|
10月20日（木） |
石川竜一郎 氏 |
ヴィクセル型取引ネットワークにおけるエッジワース競争の分析 |
|
11月24日（木） |
宮城島
要 氏 (早稲田大学) |
Education inequality among different social groups |
|
12月15日(木) |
田中 知美氏 |
Does Marriage Work as a Savings
Commitment Device? |
|
1月19日(木) |
土橋 俊寛 氏 |
Sequential Internet auctions with different ending rules |
|
3月1日（木） |
和田良子氏（敬愛大学） |
A Factor Analysis of Transaction Costs in Time Preference Experiments |
|
3月1日（木） |
鍵原理人氏 （福岡大学経済学部） |
囚人のジレンマにおける協力の選択に対する非協力探知型情報構造の効果についての実験的研究 |
· 日時：2011年10月3日(月） 16時30分から18時00分
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室
· 報告者：Ron Harstad, (Univ. of Missouri)
· 題目：Political Economy Field Experiments Become Possible.
· 概要：An important part of a field experiment measuring the effectiveness
of a proposed policy (social, environmental, public god
provision, etc.) would be to gather information about
its allocative efficiency.
Efficiency measures are a standard part of lab
experiments in economics. The talk
will explain how efficiency is measured in the lab, why
that method cannot be used in the field, and propose a new
definition and new method that would allow observing
allocative efficiency in the field. Initial
demonstrations of the methodology will be discussed.
· 日時：2011年10月13日(木） 16時30分から18時00分
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者：Dimitry Rtischev 氏(学習院大学)
· 題目：Evolution of preferences, mindsight, and cooperation
· 概要：Even in anonymous one-shot interactions humans often do not behave as if each is maximizing his own payoff while assuming others do the
same. This propensity to sidestep the logic of Nash equilibrium and the common
knowledge of rationality can lead to more cooperation and economically better
outcomes in social dilemma situations. But can such a propensity evolve among
self-interested agents? Taking hints
from evolutionary psychology and interpersonal neurobiology, we focus on
mindsight, the capability to perceive how another person is disposed to
behave. We model the evolution of
preferences and mindsight in a population of self-interested agents living in
an environment that requires team production for survival and reproduction. We
show that if agents are randomly matched to play a two-agent team production
game, preferences and mindsight may evolve, allowing agents to partially
overcome the social dilemma within each dyad and produce significantly more
than in Nash equilibrium, but not as much as under full cooperation.
· 日時：2011年10月20日(木） 16時30分から18時00分
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者：石川竜一郎 氏 (筑波大学)
· 題目： ヴィクセル型取引ネットワークにおけるエッジワース競争の分析
· 概要：本稿では、経済取引を行う相手がヴィクセル的三角形のネットワーク構造で制約された取引の分析例を示す。この分析は、取引ネットワークに参加する経済主体の人数で分類して進められる。取引主体の人数で分類した分析を通じて、その増加が競争的取引にどのように影響を及ぼすかを明示的に扱う。特に本稿では、経済取引のコア配分の集合の包含関係を通じて競争的取引への影響を検証する。
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者：田中 知美 氏 (Arizona State University)
· 題目：Does Marriage Work as a Savings Commitment Device? :Experimental Evidence from Vietnam
· 概要：We conducted a time discounting experiment with married couples, and
examined how time preferences, particularly time
inconsistency, affect intrahousehold financial decision
making. Our experimental results suggest people are more patient when they make
decisions jointly with their spouses. The analysis of survey data shows
time-inconsistent individuals turn over smaller percentages of their earnings
to their spouses. Time-inconsistent husbands are more likely to keepcash within
households compared with time-consistent husbands. Time-inconsistent
individuals are given smaller amounts of allowances, but they tend to conceal
money to compensate. In addition, time-inconsistent subjects choose not to ask
their spouses to keep their experimentalearnings and save it for them in the
experiment. This study shows marriage does not function (or may counteract) as
a savings commitment device, especially for time-inconsistent individuals. This
implies households need external savings commitment devices such as ROSCAs to protect
money from spouses who have hyperbolic preferences.
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者：土橋 俊寛 氏 (大東文化大学)
· 題目：Sequential Internet auctions with different ending rules
· 概要：Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. The hard close auction involves a fixed deadline, while
the deadline in the soft close auction may be extended
if at least one bid is submitted in the final few
minutes. Thus, the soft close allows buyers to submit
ofter observing the opponent’s bids even in the last minutes. Ending rules change both the seller’s and the buyers’ strategies. In a
sequential auction with the soft close, buyers have a stronger
incentive to wait for low reserve prices in the future, and a seller chooses lower reserve prices.
· 場所：早稲田大学早稲田キャンパス1号館4階1-401教室
· 報告者①：和田良子氏（敬愛大学）
· 題目：A Factor Analysis of Transaction Costs in Time Preference Experiments
· 概要：実験により計測された時間選好率が高すぎることは良く知られているが，我々の研究は，時間選好率の計測結果に含まれるバイアスを取り除いて，純粋な時間選好に近いものを計測する試みである．バイアスの要因は時間選好率を測る実験の手法に共通かつ不可避なものである．確実な今すぐの報酬の受けとりと等価な将来報酬を回答させるとき，実験者への報酬の預託コストと後日報酬を受け取るコストがあると考えられる．この2つについて，1回のみの報酬受け取りによる先行研究では区別できなかったが，我々は報酬受取りを2回にしたことで，各要素の分離が可能になり，その結果，より低い時間選好率を得た．
· 題目：囚人のジレンマにおける協力の選択に対する非協力探知型情報構造の効果についての実験的研究
· 概要：囚人のジレンマの利得構造の下で，プレイヤーの先手/後手の手番はランダムに決められ，先手が非協力行動を選択する場合にのみその行動が後手によって観察されるとする．このゲームと通常の囚人のジレンマとの相違は情報構造の違いに帰着する．情報構造がこのように修正された囚人のジレンマを非協力探知型情報構造を持つ囚人のジレンマと呼ぶ．非協力探知型情報構造を持つ囚人のジレンマには，利得構造がある一定の条件を満たすとき，双方のプレイヤーが協力的戦略を選択して協力行動がプレイされるナッシュ均衡が存在する．本研究の目的は，このゲームの協力的戦略の選択比率が，通常の囚人のジレンマの協力的戦略（協力行動）の選択比率に比べて，高いか否かを実験によって検証することにある．実験の結果，理論が示唆する範囲の利得構造において，協力的戦略の選択比率は非協力探知型情報構造を持つ囚人のジレンマで高まることが示される．
|
日程 |
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
10月15日（金） |
Robert Veszteg 氏 |
Some experimental results on decentralized matching markets |
|
10月25日（月） |
William Thomson 氏 |
On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation |
|
11月5日（金） |
竹澤
正哲 氏 |
Do people use the second-order information for forming reputation?: Memory-based indirect reciprocity |
|
11月19日（金） |
田中 知美 氏 |
Committing the Uncommitted: Rosca as a Saving Commitment Device for Sophisticated Hyperbolic Discounters |
|
12月10日（金） |
Marc Willinger 氏 |
Income Redistribution and Public Good Provision: an Experiment |
|
12月17日（金） |
高宮 浩司 氏 |
Complexity consideration on the existence of strategy-proof social choice functions |
|
1月14日（金） |
Rene van den Brink 氏 |
Axiomatizations of a Positional Power Score and Measure for Hierarchies |
|
1月27日（木） |
Charles Noussair 氏 |
Prudence, Temperance, and Demographics |
|
2月24日（木） |
Mardyla Greg 氏 |
Borrowing Behavior and Attitudes towards Risk and Time Experimental Approach |
|
日程 |
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
4月19日（月） |
戸田 学 氏 |
Characterization of Stable Solutions in Matching Markets |
|
5月17日（月） |
井上朋紀 氏 |
Representation of TU games by coalition production economies |
|
5月31日（月） |
坂東桂介 氏 |
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities of firms |
|
6月14日（月） |
安田洋祐 氏 |
学校選択制のマッチング分析：最新理論と日本の制度設計 |
|
6月21日（月） |
Farhad Husseinov 氏 |
Monotonic extension and its applications in the choice theory |
|
7月26日（月） |
小島武仁 氏 |
Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program (joint with Yuichiro Kamada) |
|
日程 |
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
10月16日（金） |
Robert Veszteg 氏 |
Learning and playing best response in the hide-and-seek game |
|
11月2日（月） |
グレーヴァ香子 氏 |
Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Reference Letters |
|
11月9日（月） |
Gustavo Bergantinos 氏 |
※若手研究者向けセミナー |
|
11月12日（木） |
Gustavo Bergantinos 氏 |
The division problem with voluntary participation |
|
11月26日（木） |
浅古泰史 氏 |
Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate |
|
11月27日（金） |
加藤晋 氏 |
Conditions for Cyclic Social Preference |
|
12月10日（木） |
海老名剛 氏 |
Option Package Bundling |
|
12月11日（金） |
藤中裕二 氏 |
公平分担問題におけるメカニズムデザイン |
|
12月15日（火） |
Zaifu
Yang 氏 |
Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages |
|
12月17日（木） |
下津克己 氏 |
Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models |
|
12月21日（月） |
小島武仁 氏 |
Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem |
|
1月30日（土） |
篠潤之介 氏 |
Farsighted Stable Sets in Hotelling's Location Games |
|
2月1日（月） |
Charles Noussair 氏 |
※若手研究者向けセミナー |
|
2月5日（金） |
Charles Noussair 氏 |
How Others Influence One’s Behavior: Investigation with fMRI Imaging |
|
2月22日（月） |
Menahem E. Yaari氏 |
Justice and the Market |
|
3月23日（火） |
Bettina Klaus 氏 |
※若手研究者向けセミナー |
|
3月24日（水） |
Bettina Klaus 氏 |
※若手研究者向けセミナー |
|
3月30日（火） |
Bettina Klaus 氏 |
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities |
|
3月30日（火） |
西條辰義
氏 |
A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma: 100% Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage |
|
日程 |
報告者（所属） |
報告タイトル |
|
4月20日（月） |
中山幹夫 氏 |
On Coalitional Strategic Games |
|
5月15日（金） |
西村直子 氏 |
おコメ市場とAverage Price Two-sided Auction |
|
5月18日（月） |
中原裕之 氏 |
価値に基づく意思決定、その時間選好と文脈効果：神経メカニズムとその数理 |
|
6月1日（月） |
Stef Tijs 氏 |
Lexicographic optimization in cooperative game theory |
|
6月8日（月） |
Stef Tijs 氏 |
Cooperative games and auctions |
|
6月17日（水） |
John Wooders 氏 |
Auctions with Heterogeneous Entry Costs |
|
6月22日（月） |
John Wooders 氏 |
Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab |
|
6月23日（火） |
笠島 洋一 氏 |
Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses |
|
7月13日（月） |
坂井 豊貴 氏 |
Choosing someone with monetary transfers: a comprehensive analysis |
|
7月21日（火） |
二本杉 剛
氏 |
Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?: An Experiment on Direct Nash Implementation |
|
7月24日（金） |
岩崎 敦 氏 |
Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions |
|
大田直樹
氏 |
Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations |
|
|
7月27日（月） |
J.J. Herings 氏 |
Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution |
|
8月31日（月） |
Peter Gardenfors 氏 |
A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences |
|
Jean-Francois Laslier 氏 |
Approval Voting in Theory, in the Field, and in the Lab |
|
|
9月2日（水） |
Walter Bossert 氏 |
Economics of Rational Choice |
|
9月4日（金） |
Bhaskar Dutta 氏 |
Honest Implementation |
|
9月15日（火） |
Michele Lombardi 氏 |
Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle |
以下は本研究会に関連する連続講義・セミナーのお知らせです．
|
No. |
日時 |
トピック |
会場 |
備考 |
|
Lecture 1 |
29 May Fri. 14:45-16:15 |
Mixed-strategy experiments: The O’Neill game and “Blind Stealing” |
4-202 |
|
|
Lecture 2 |
1 June Mon 13:00-14:30 |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Blind Stealing. Discussion of experimental results. |
4-202 |
Readings:O Neill, B. (1987): “Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games,”Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 84, 2106-2109. Walker, M., and J. Wooders (2001): “Minimax Play at Wimbledon,”American Economic Review 91, 1521-1538. |
|
Lecture 3 |
5 June Fri. 14:45-16:15 |
Auction experiments: First and second price sealed bid auctions, common value auctions |
4-202 |
|
|
Lecture 4 |
8 June Mon 13:00-14:30 |
First Price Auctions |
4-202 |
Readings: Krishna Chapters 1 and 2* |
|
Lecture 5 |
12 June Fri. 14:45-16:15 |
The Revenue Equivalence Principle |
4-202 |
Readings: Krishna Chapter 3* |
|
Lecture 6 |
15 June Mon 13:00-14:30 |
Extensions-risk aversion, budget constraints |
4-202 |
Readings: Krishna Chapter 4* |
|
Lecture 7 |
19 June Fri. 14:45-16:15 |
Mechanism Design |
4-202 |
Readings: Krishna Chapter 5* |
|
Lecture 8 |
22 June Mon 13:00-14:30 |
Buy It Now Auctions |
4-202 |
Readings: Reynolds, S., & J. Wooders (2009): “Auctions with a Buy Price,”EconomicTheory 38, 9-39. Shahriar, Q., and J. Wooders (2007): “An Experimental Study of Auctions with a Buy Price Under Private and Common Values,”University of Arizona Working Paper #07-19. |
|
Lecture 9 |
26 June Fri. 14:45-16:15 |
Auctions with interdependent values |
4-202 |
Readings: Krishna Chapter 6* |
|
No. |
日時 |
トピック |
会場 |
備考 |
|
Lecture 1 |
2 June Tue. 16:30-18:00 |
Multi-choice Games I |
4-206 |
|
|
Lecture 2 |
3 June Wed. 16:30-18:00 |
Multi-choice Games II |
4-202 |
|
|
Lecture 3 |
5 June Fri. 9:00-10:30 |
Multi-choice Games III |
4-202 |
|
|
Lecture 4 |
9 June Tue 16:30-18:00 |
Interval Games I |
4-206 |
|
|
Lecture 5 |
10 June Wed. 16:30-18:00 |
Interval Games II |
4-202 |
以下は本研究会に関連するWorkshopの情報です．